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Abstract:
Global warming and resulting climate change present the world
with major and potentially devastating challenges. China is among
the countries that wiU suffer
的 per

the 向伊cts

of climate change. Although

capita emissions of pollutants causing global warming

remain relatively low compared to the world's richest countries,
China is now the second largest global polluter, and in coming
decades it will overtake the United States as the world's largest
polluter of the global atmosphere. How China responds to this
problem has profound implications for its people, its neighbors and
the world. China

hαs

joined with other countries in debating this

issue, and it has started to implement programs and policies to
reduce 的 emissions of so-called greenhouse gases. However, its
domestic actions have rarely been motivated by concerns about the
global impacts of climate change, and its response has been to avoid
international regulation while waiting for the developed countries 的
ac t. Given th臼 response， short of radical change in politics and
environment, it is unlikely that China will

adeqωtely

restrain its

greenhouse gas emissions, thus mirroring - to the detriment of all the industrialization and growth of the world's wealthy countries.

China has risen to become the Asian Pacific region's pre-eminent
economic and political force. Wh ile it haS con仕ibuted to regional
economic growth , it has simultaneously taken on the unenviable role
of being the region's largest polluter. Among its new distinctions ,
China is now the second largest source - after the United States . of
pollutants th剖 are warming the global atmosphere. 2 A generation has
passed since the world's governments began to seriously consider the
problems of global warming and resulting climate change. 3 We
know that global warming is caused by human activities - notably
the buming of coal , oil and other fossil fuels - resulting in the
emissions of carbon dioxide and other 'greenhouse gases' (GHGS).4
Global warming in turn is causing climate change, which is
manifested in rising sea levels , droughts , floods , spread of pests ,
harm to natural ecosystems and species , and other usually adverse
consequences. As these impacts on environmental security have
become c1 earer , govemments have started to work unilaterally and in
concert to adapt to and - much less robustly - mitigate c1 imate
change.
The first decade of international cooperation on global
warming resulted in the 1992 United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change (F CCC) , signed at the Ri o Earth
Summit. Subsequent intemational negotiations , notably those
surrounding the 1997 Kyoto Protocol to the FCCC - which laid out
very modest mandatory reductions in developed-country GHG
emissions - and follow-on discussions regarding implementation
have been fraught with difficulties and differences among countries.
The countries of Asia Pacific have been important participants in
these international negotiations. lndeed , they are crucial to global
efforts to address climate change , if for no other reason than their
economic growth has made them major emitters of greenhouse gases.
Furthermore , Asia Pacific encompasses many of the developing
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countries and peoples who will be most adversely affected by
climate change. 5
F or those concemed about the environmental threats to human
and national security, arguably the most important Asian Pacific
country is China. 6 China's population has reached about 1.3 billion
people, and its economy is one of the world's largest and fastest
growing. Consequently, China is experiencing widespread and often
acute environmental problems with severe local, national and
regional consequences. 7 It already produces vast amounts of GHGs,
especially carbon dioxide from the buming of fossil fuels (i.e. , coal ,
oil and natural gas). Due to its high economic development and low
energy efficiency, in the early 1990s China became the world's
second largest national source of GHGs , and it will become the
largest source by about 2020. 8 China is also important in the climate
change debate because it is a leading member of the developing
world, giving it political and diplomatic powers that enable it to
influence intemational environmental negotiations.
In other words, China is central to successful regional and
global efforts to protect environmental security. Understanding its
responses to global warming and climate change is important for
scholars, practitioners and laypersons interested in global warming
and other critical environmental problems. More broadly,
understanding China's response to global warming can help
illuminate the variables that shape the climate change policies of
other countries within the region and beyond. From a narrow
Chinese perspective , too , the harms done by climate change are
potential and real environmental threats. Climate change has been
recognized as a danger in China since the 1990s and has increasingly
caught the atlention of China's leaders. Global warming may lead to
sea level rise and some extreme weather events, which cause coastal
flooding and damage in China. Global warming can lead to
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environmental degradation and resource scarcities in China,
particularly in water resources. It could also contribute to existing
tensions in the region, increasing the potential for violent intra- and
inter-state conflict. 9
With these considerations in mind, in this article we look at
some of the consequences of climate change faced by Asia Pacific
and particularly China. We describe China's domestic and
intemational responses to this problem and

a仕empt

to explain them.

Finally, we discuss some of the implications of China's response to
climate change for environmental security in Asia Pacific. The
upshot is that China is not doing enough, instead waiting on the rich
countries of the world to take much more concerted action. To be
sure , China has a strong ethical case for expecting the developed
countries to act firs t. However, its fa i1 ure to act more robustly now
may place it under greater moral scrutiny by future generations.
Effects of Global Warming: Adversity for China and Asia
Pacific
The preponderance of evidence on global warming and climate
change is very clear: climate change presents China and Asia-Pacific
with m吋 or challenges. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change (IPCC) has concluded that human activities are adding
GHGs to the atmosphere , and that this is having a discemable impact
by increasing global temper剖ures. 10 Overall , scientific predictions
point to adverse global consequences , particularly in p訂ts of the
world where geographic vulnerability and poverty make adaptation
difficult or impossible. 11 The countries of Asia Pacific will not be
immune to these changes , and in most cases they will be among the
worst affected due to their vulnerable geographies and economies. 12
What are the expected impacts of climate change in China and
its region? Several research reports have anticipated the effects of
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climate change for Asia. For example, the 2001 third assessment
report of the IPCC argues that Asia is potentially more susceptible to
climate change than are some other regions of the wo r1 d. 13 It
concludes that the developing countries of Asia are highly
vulnerable , and their adaptability is low. Floods , forest fires ,
cyclones , droughts and other extreme events have increased in
temperate and tropical Asia. While agricultural productivity could
increase in northem parts of Asia, food security would suffer in arid ,
tropical and temperate Asia due to reduced agricultural and
aquaculture productivity from warmer water, sea-level rise , floods ,
droughts and cyclones. Water availability may decrease in arid and
semi-arid Asia and possibly increase in northem Asia, and increased
incidence of vector-bome diseases and heat-stress will threaten
human health. Temperate and tropical Asia should anticipate
increased rainfall and floods. Ri sing sea level and more intense
storms could 'displace tens of millions of people in low-lying coastal
areas of temperate and tropical Asia\14 Some parts of Asia will see
adverse climate change effects on

transp。此，

increased demand for

energy, and adverse impacts on tourism. Land-use and land-cover
changes will threaten biodiversity, and sea-level rise will adversely
impact coral reefs and mangrove areas that are important for
fisheries.
Climate change will likely cause - and may be causing already
- many adverse impacts in China. 15 China may see greater weather
extremes , including droughts in the north and floods in the south ,
and heat stroke and death will increase, as may occurrences of
malaria , dengue fever and other diseases. 16 Hotter weather will
increase heat-related mortality , as indicated by historical studies
from China showing a strong correlation between peak summer
temperatures and death rates. 17 Among other prominent impacts are

5

those to agriculture , forests , water resources , and impacts arising
fmm rising seas-IB
Climate change affects agriculture through impacts on crops ,
soils , insects , weeds , dise泊的， and livestock. 19 Thomas Schelling
argues that China is 'dependent on agriculture and will therefore
suffer much more from global warming than developed countries'?O
If recent climate change trends continue , much of Chinese
agriculture is likely to face shorter growing periods and increased
water deficits , requiring more irrigation. Under these conditions ,
Chinese crop production, especially of wheat and com , could
decrease by 10 percent by 2050. 21 In short, 'Possible impacts of
climate change on Chinese agriculture could be highly disruptive\22
Forest areas suffering 企om desertification in China are already
increasing at a rapid rate , which wiU be exacerbated by climate
change. 23 By 1998 , the total area of desertification in China had
reached 2.62 million square kilometers - over one-quarter of the
country's surface area - and it is increasing at an annual rate of 6700
square kilometers-24
Most of China has experienced an average annual temperature
increase of more than 1 degree Celsius in the last

centu旬，

mostly

since the 1970s, with substantial warming expected in this century. 25
Permafrost in northeast China is expected to disappear (releasinK
methane , a potent GHG, adding to global warming) and glaciers will
melt. Northem China is particularly vulnerable to expected changes
in rainfall , exacerbating already-severe water shortages. 26 Climate
change may also cause more floods in China. From 1950 to 1989 the
area suffering from flood in China was about 8 million hectares
annually , with that

suffering 企om

drought reaching 20 million

hectares. Since 1990 , the annual average area suffering from
flooding has increased to about 22.7 million hectares. 27 These
changes can be expected to continue with global warming.
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Coastlines in China will be damaged by sea-level rise , as will
aquifers inundated with salt water. China's 32 ,000-kilometer
coastline is densely populated and highly developed. 2~ One study
predicts that sea-level rise along China's coast will be 15-26
centimeters by 2050 , reaching 40-74 centimeters by 2100. 29 lndeed,
many of China's coastal areas will be under water if past and
anticipated trends continue. 30
Overall , 70 percent of the Chinese people , as well as 80 percent
of their industries , agriculture sector and cities , are

alrea命 'seriously

threatened' by natural disasters. Millions of people have died 企om
31

such events , nearly one-third of government revenue is spent on
fighting them , and up to 6 percent of GNP is lost as a result. 32 These
losses wiU only increase as climate changes.
What

comes 企om

reports on the impacts of climate change in

Asia Pacific is that many of the effects will be felt most by - and be
most painful for - the developing countries of the region , including
China, often because they are more vulnerable and less able to cope
due to poverty and existing environmental problems and resource
scarcltles.
China's National Response to Global Warming
Rapid econornic growth in China has been and wiU be associated
with rapid increases in fossil fuel use , the primary source of carbon
dioxide and the chief GHG. As a developing country, China is
seeking to industrialize and rnodernize. Both economic activity and ,
to an even greater extent, energy dernands are currently expanding
much faster than is typical of other countries. China's annual
economic growth averaged 11 percent frorn 1978 to 1993 and is
expected to continue at subsequent rates of about 8 percent annually
to 2020. 33
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China faces a number of challenges in this respect. One of the
most important is reducing the adverse environmental impacts
associated with rapid economic growth in a coal-based economy.
Few countries in the world depend on coal as heavily as China does.
Coal accounts for 90 percent of China's fossil fuel resources , with
coal consumption reaching 1.3 billion tons in 1995 ,34 accounting for
80 percent of primary commercial energy demand. China's carbon
dioxide emissions reached 800 million tons in 1995 , ranking it
second in the world after the United States. 35 If current trends
continue , by 2020 China's average per capita energy consumption
will match the current global average , meaning that China alone will
account for almost one-third of the world's total GHG emissions
between 1990 and 2020. 36 To be sure , China's current per capita
emissions of GHGs are low compared to the industrialized countries ,
but with almost 1.3 billion people its aggregate contribution to
global warming is huge and growing. This prospect becomes clear
when one considers the burgeoning middle class in China, whose
lifestyle choices will lead to dramatic increases in per-capita energy
use.
The Chinese government recognized some environmental
problems and began addressing them as early as the 1950s, but into
the 1970s it argued that, as a socialist state , it did not have
environmental problems. However, by the 1980s , increasing damage
to China's natural environment and adverse environmental impacts
on economic development led to greater government concern. In
1982 the Chinese constitution was rewritten, pledging to 'protect the
environment and natural resources by controlling pollution and its
societal impact, ensure the sensible use of natural resources , and
safeguard rare animals and plants'. 37 The following year
environmental preservation was declared one of China's b前 ic
national policies and by the end of the decade China started its first

8

major campaign to combat poll凶ion.

38

During the 1980s the

govemment also instituted new environmental protection laws in the
areas of solid waste , noise , air and water pollution ,39 and by the mid
1990s the govemment was becoming more serious about
environmental issues , with state leaders expressing their concem. 40
By the late 1990s the central govemment was allocating substantial
- albeit grossly inadequate - funds to environmental and resource
protection-41
China has undertaken some policies and national development
strategies , and created related domestic institutions , specifically
related to climate change. 42 Environmentally sustainability has been
adopted as a key strategy guiding Chinese development. Following
the 1992 Earth Summit, China completed its official 'Agenda 21'
sustainable development plan, which included climate change as one
of the priority areas. Sustainable development was a guideline for
the preparation ofChina's Ninth (1 996-2000) and Tenth (2001-2005)
Five-Y ear Plans for national economic and social development.
China's system of laws and regulations on sustainable development
has also been improved. The govemment has promulgated the
Environment Protection Law (1989) , the Law on the Prevention and
Control of Atmospheric Pollution (1 987) , the Forest Law (1989) , the
Energy Conservation Law (1997) and similar legal instruments for
environmental and atmospheric protection. Furthermore , a series of
administrative regulations and sector-level rules on the conservation
of resources and the environment have been issued.
Under the State Council , China established the 1998 National
Coordination Committee for Climate Change, which is responsible
for the coordination and formulation of policies and measures
related to climate change. This committee, chaired by the State
Development Planning Commission (SDPC) , is composed of the
Chinese Academy of Sciences and 13 government departments
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(Ministry of Foreign Affairs [MOFA] , Ministry of Development and
Planning , Ministry of Science and Technology, State Economic and
Trade Commission, China Meteorological Administration, Ministry
of Finance, State Environmental Protection Administration , Ministry
of Agriculture , Ministry of Communications , Ministry of Water
Resources , Ministry of Construction, State Forestry Administration,
and State Oceanic Administration) , giving it an important
coordinating function.
China has also undertaken comprehensive climate change
research, much of it with intemational assistance. lndeed ,
demonstrating the importance of the FCCC for China's development,
since the Eighth Five-year plan (1991-1995) , global climate change
has been listed as a priority in plans for state scientific development.
Numerous universities , scientific institutes and researchers have
been involved in research relating to global warming.
However, the environmental benefits of these laws and other
actions of the central Chinese govemment have often been limited.
lmplementation of environmentallaws is hindered by lack of money,
corruption, the refusal of local authorities to ~ake the laws seriously
and the inability or unwillingness of higher officials to force them to
do so. Beijing often has limited control over the vast bureaucracy,
particularly outside Beijing, and the institutional structure of China's
environmental management system is extraordinarily complex.
Underlying the inability to implement environmental protections is a
strong nationwide fixation on economic growth. According to one
observer , even 'the government often ignores some of its
environmental policies and regulations and does what it thinks is
necessary for economic advancement\43 Wealth creation in the short
term almost always wins out over environmental protection. 44
Where China may have had some apparent success is in its
energy efficiency. Wh ile its energy use is skyrocketing - and will
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continue to do so short of a

m句 or

economic depression - there is

data suggesting that its energy use is growing at a slower rate than
its economy. (However , this assertion is in dispute due to
questionable govemment statistics and must be considered anecdotal
pending more reliable data. 45 ) Some developed country govemments
- notably the United

Stat的一 demand

that China do more to limit its

GHG emissions. But this evidence suggests

th前 China

is already

more efficient than some of those critics - in c1 uding the United
States. Having said this , should these efficiencies prove to be real ,
they are not motivated by a desire to limit global warming. 46
Furthermore, as Thomas

Schelling

argues that because of

technological backwardness and poverty, China has limited capacity
to fight climate change, and without economic incentives China will
be hard pressed to wean itself 企om its dependence on inefficient
coal use. 47
China's International Response to Global Warming
How has China responded diplomatically to c1 imate change?
Broadly spealàng, China's environmental diplomacy has sought to
further several goals: protect Chinese sovereignty, acquire foreign
aid and technical assistance , promote China's economic
development,48 and promote its role as a responsible great power and
leader o.f the developing world. China has used its dual status as a
developing country (with rights to and needs for development) and
its growing role as a major contributor to global environmental
problems (such as GHG emissions) to acquire substantial influence
in intemational environmental negotiations.

49

In intemational

environmental deliberations of all kinds , it has consistently sought
'new and additional' funds from developed countries in retum for its
support for , or acquiescence to , environmental agreements. These
efforts have paid off; China is the largest recipient of environmental
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aid from the World Bank and receives substantial amounts of
environmental aid from other intemational funding agencies. Indeed ,
the vast majority of its environmental budget comes from abroad. 50
China is also receiving environmental technologies , such as those
offered in the context of the FCC C' s Clean Development Mechanism
(CDM) , which funds climate change-related projects in developing
countries. 51
China has been intimately involved in intemational
deliberations on global warming and resulting climate change. Like
other participants in the climate change negotiations , China wants to
protect its interests and promote development while also joining
international efforts to address this problem. However, it has
opposed every effort to require GHG limits by developing countries
- even those calling for voluntary commitments to restrict 扣ture
emissions increases.

52

Instead, China has joined with other

developing countries in demanding that developed countries reduce
their GHG emissions first and provide assistance to developing
countries to help them cope with climate change and to implement
sustainable development. It has usually resisted any links between
financial and technical assistance from developed countries in the
context of the climate change regime. Instead , it has demanded
transfers of funds on non-commercial and preferential terms , and has
rejected most of the market-based international mechanisms for
emissions reductions advocated by developed countries and their
industries. 53 China has made some contributions to the FCCC
negotiations , notably when doing so would help codify requirements
that developed countries help developing countries in the context of
climate change. It proposed a resolution on technology transfer,
which was adopted by the first conference of the parties (COP) held
in Berlin in 1995. During COP2 , China proposed that developed
countries list in their national communications measures they were
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undertaking to implement technology transfer to developing
countries. This proposal was adopted. According to one observer,
'only when outsiders (e.g. , the GEF [Global Environment Facility])
have paid the incremental costs has China been willing to implement
global warming projects\54 Once it was established th剖 developing
countries would not be required to take on any obligatory
commitments under the FCCC , China embraced the Kyoto Protocol
and efforts to implement it.
The Chinese themselves have identified three stages in China's
official participation in the conferences of the parties to the FCCC. 55
During the first stage, from about 1990 to mid-1992 , China sought to
formulate a homegrown set of policies toward the climate change
convention. Two policies came out of this process: (l) the principle
of 'common but differentiated responsibilities' , meaning that China
would share responsibilities in information communication and
scientific research while not incurring any economic burdens or
requirements that it reduce its energy use , and (2) strengthening of
China's scientific and technological research in the climate change
field. In this early phase of the FCCC negotiations , China took a
relatively low-profile position compared to many other countries. 56
The second stage of China's participation in the climate change
negotiations lasted 企om mid-1992 to late-1997. At the Ri o Earth
Summit in June 1992, then Premier Li Peng noted

th~t

GHG

emissions were threatening the national security of many countries
and regions , and put his signature to the FCCC. From that date , the
FCCC took on a prominent role in China's diplomacy, and China
pledged to uphold the convention. 57 The greatest subsequent
challenges for China in the conferences of the parties to the FCCC
were the Kyoto Protocol and the so-called f1 exible mechanisms for
its implementation, such as the CDM, joint implementation

(咒，

whereby polluters could offset their emissions with projects in other

13

countries) and intemational emissions trading (IET).58 China lagged
far behind the developed countries in the fields of climate science
and economics , and Chinese officials had not yet arrived at a
consensus on the flexible mechanisms. 59 Some of these officials
called the mechanisms tools of 'environmental imperialism'. 60
Elizabeth Economy argues that during this stage of China's climate
change diplomacy,
China remained committed to only general framework
convention commitments for the signatories , especially with
regard to curtailing emissions of the principal greenhouse gas.
China held

th前 any

action that did not concurrently advance

economic growth would have to be funded by the intemational
community. Moreover, Chinese officials rallied the developing
states behind their position in an a位empt - in large part
successful - to establish a united front for bargaining with the
advanced industrialized countries. 61
The third stage of China's climate change diplomacy ranged
from late-1997 - when the parties to the FCCC agreed to the Kyoto
protocol - to the present. During this period , Chinese diplomacy has
focused on two issues: (l) how to accept the developed countries'
intemational environmental trading mechanisms and (2) preventing
developing countries from being forced to assume concrete
responsibilities for GHG emissions reductions. China's strategy was
- and remains - to avoid requirements that developing countries
reduce their GHG emissions. Chen Yaobang , head of China's
diplomatic delegations to climate related conferences , said in at the
Kyoto COP3 in 1997 that China adamantly opposed any
commitment to reduce its GHG emissions before it becomes a
'middle-income' country. He also rejected emissions-trading and
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joint-implementation schemes , insisting that these approaches were
unacceptable because they would allow developed countries to shirk
their responsibilities for emissions reductions at home while
'disregarding the living environment of people in other countries ,.62
Subsequently, at COP5 in 1999 , the Chinese delegation , headed by
Liu Jiang , reiterated the basic positions that China had expounded at
COP3. On the issue of Chinese commitment to limiting greenhouse
gas emissions , Liu said, 'it is impossible for the Chinese govemment
to undertake any obligation of GHG emissions reduction before
China attains the level of a medium-developed country\63 He said
that China would instead 'continue striving to abate the growth of
GHG emissions in line with her own sustainable development
strategy, and will continue actively promoting and participating in
international cooperation\64
In contrast to the previous stage of its diplomacy , China did not
raise objections to the flexibility mechanisms. This reflected a very
slow transformation in its attitude toward, and perception and
knowledge of, the flexible mechanisms

企om

outright opposition to

gradual if muted acceptance. This rather slow acceptance was a
consequence of China having very few experts able to study these
mechanisms , limiting its understanding of them. According to one
Chinese assessment of the situation, 'the flexible mechanisms are
very complicated, and we know little about

them. 乳T e

should take

the 'no voice' [Bu Biao Tai] policy in this issue\ 的 Some officials
have argued that China opposes CDM projects in China to avoid
intemational monitoring of its energy industry.66 After 2000 , with
additional development of Chinese lmowledge regarding the flexible
mechanisms , China began to show greater interests in some smallscale (i.e. , not country-wide) CDM projects using assistance from
the Asian Development Bank and other institutions. In ongoing
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c1 imate change negotiations , China continues to oppose other

mechanisms , such as

n and IET.

China has sometimes used a form of passive resistance during
c1 imate change negotiations , articulating a policy of 'no response' to

some international events (e.g;, the Bush administration's rejection
of the Kyoto Protocol). 1n 2000 , China put forward a 'no regrets'
policy for the FCCC negotiations (meaning that it will share some
concrete responsibilities to reduce the GHG emissions provided they
do 110t adversely affect its economic development) , began to accept
the

international

environmental

trading

mechanism ,

and

implemented CDM-related projects in Gansu and Shanxi Province ,
using financial assistance from the Asian Development Bank. With
assistance from the United States , China also finished its national
report on c1 imate change, one of the few commitments required of
developing countries by the FCCC. 67
However, despite pressure from the United States , Europe and
some other countries to reduce its GHG emissions , China has to date
refused to take on concrete commitments to do so. China expects the
developed, wealthy

count~ies

of the world to substantially reduce

their emissions before it and other developing countries are expected
to do so, in accordance with the principle of common but
differentiated responsibility adopted at the 1995 Berlin conference of
the parties.
China's Response to Global Warming: Some Explanations
Elizabeth Economy argues that several principles have guided
Chinese environmental foreign policy in this area: sovereignty, the
primacy of economic development , and the historic responsibility of
the developed countries. 68 We can add the important long-term
commitment of China to be a leader of developing countries on the
world

stage, including

within the
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context

of intemational

environmental cooperation. Zhang Zhihong argues that the official
Chinese position on climate change has revolved around four themes:

(1) China is a victim of global climate change; (2) developed
countries are the principal emitters of GHG emissions and
therefore should bear the primary responsibility in addressing
the climate change problem; (3) in light of their current and
historical responsibilities and much greater capabilities to act,
developed countries should undertake transfers of advanced,
environmentally friendly technologies and provide financial
assistance to developing countries in combating climate change
while meeting the needs of sustainable development; and (4)
China's overriding priority is poverty eradication and economic
development.的

Reiterating and expanding on themes suggested by Economy
and Zhang, we can emphasize several forces that have shaped much
of China's climate change diplomacy. First, China has an
overwhelming desire to protect its sovereignty, including avoiding
the 'humiliation' of being forced to comply with standards set by
outsiders. In 1992 , Chinese Premier Li Peng explained China's view
succinctly: 'Intemational cooperation should be strengthened on the
basis of respecting national sovereignty'.70 There are four aspects to
the Chinese notion of 'environmental sovereignty' 71: (1) China
should enjoy full use of its own natural resources according to the
United

Nations'

1974

Charter

of

Economic

Rights

and

Responsibilities. (2) China should be able to develop and utilize its
natural resource according to its own priorities and according to the
1972 declaration of United Nations Conference on the Human
Environment. (3) China will establish its environmental policies and
laws according to the principle of non-intervention. (4) Other
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countries and international institutions should respect China's
sovereignty with regard to global commons issues , namely climate
change. In short, much like other countries , while China has joined

in intemational collective action to deal with climate change , it
insists on the right to enjoy, develop , utilize and protect its own
natural resources by itsel f.
Second, China's climate change policies , both domestic and
international , are motivated by priorities of economic stability and
growth. Global warming has been intimately linked with efforts to
modernize the economy, as well as the energy strategy employed to
fuel that modemization. China, like other countries , fears that
policies for reducing GHG emissions will adversely affect economic
growth. According to some Chinese experts , the economic cost of
significantly reducing China's GHG emissions through alterations in
the energy industry, introducing clean energy technologies and the
like could cost the equivalent ofhundreds ofbillions ofUS dollars. 72
For example, coal-based energy represents 60-70 percent of China's
energy

的ucture.

If China were to change to an oil-based or natural

gas-based energy structure , billions of dollars would be needed. 73
China also tries to seek intemational technical assistance and loans
in order to garner economic benefits , such as to improve energy
efficiency without much pomestic cost. But this is done in
accordance with the no regrets principle of acting in ways that
benefit China regardless of the threat of global warming. Thus China
also actively seeks investment from the international community for
projects that assist in slowing climate change. But economic growth
remains China's top priority.
Third, following the notion of COffiffion but differentiated
responsibility, China believes very strongly that it ought not be
forced to take on burdens associated with climate change while it
remains relatively poor and - just as importantly - until the
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developed countries take concrete action of their own. Chinese
officials , like those in many other developing countries (and some
developed ones) believe that the industrialized, wealthy countries of
the world bear responsibility for global warming because of their
historic emissions of greenhouse gases.
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Furthermore, their per

capita emissions remain far above those of China, meaning that their
responsibility continues. Any effort to persuade China to reduce its
GHG emissions or otherwise take on concrete burdens to limit
global warming run up against this very strongly held sentiment.
Fourth , following the previous point, it is important to realize that
China takes its role as a leader and representative of the developing
world very seriously, including in the context of the climate change
negotiations. During the climate change deliberations , it has worked
within a negotiating block referred to officially as the 'Group of 77
plus China'. China tries to exert its in f1 uence within this

block，的 it

does in the broader negotiations. In this context, China has adopted
terms like 'environmental colonialism' and 'sovereignty intervention'
to help foster an alliance among developing countries within the
FCCC and related intemational negotiations.
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To be sure , China

will act to promote its own interests first and foremost , even if they
contradict this leadership role. But it takes this position seriously and
will usually seek to promote policies that reaffirm it.
These and of course other forces operate in the context of China's
policymaking institutions. China's sometimes-changing positions in
the climate change negotiations show that internal politics , a
complex foreign policy-making apparatus , and intemational affairs
can combine to shape its environmental diplomacy. Just as
government agencies collaborate to formulate China's domestic
responses to climate change , they have worked together - albeit not
always for common policy

goals

一

to

devise the country's

international response to the problem. According to Abram Chayes

19

and Charlotle Kim , internal politics and bureaucratic maneuvering
among a score of govemment agencies affected China's diplomacy.76
The most important actors in China's environmental diplomacy have
usual1 y been the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) , the State
Environmental Protection Agency (SEP A) , the State Development
Planning Commission, and the State Science and Technology
Commission (SSTC). MOFA has generally viewed environmental
issues from the perspective of faimess , seeing industrialized
countries as responsible for solving problems and helping China and
other developing countries to implement sustainable development.
Other agencies view environmental problems in terms of their harm
to the Chinese people and China's developmental prospects. 77 The
increasing salience of environmental issues in intemational relations
has

strengthened environmentally

proactive

bureaucrats

and

technocrats ,78 as well as government-approved think tanks , such as
the Council for International Cooperation on Environment and
Development.
Among the agencies involved in China's foreign policy on
climate change , a few served as key 'window agents' (zhu guan
danwei or chuang kou danwei). The agency most responsible for
coordinating China's climate change negotiations is the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs , which coordinates different preferences or interests
among different bureaucracies, while the Ministry of Finance
distributes the information on international climate change funds to
79
different bureaucracies and collects their proposals. In early
climate change negotiations , MOF A and the SDPC eventual1y took
control of policy, although not without other agencies getting
involved

前

Meteorological

times ，

notably

SSTC ,

Administration,

SEPA, and the

which

inf1 uenced

China

scientific

understanding on the issue. Thus , China's position has been
'susceptible to domination . by foreign policy and state planning
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officials,.80 However, it became clear to senior policymakers and the
top leaders that joining the Kyoto Protocol could be in China's
economic, environmental and diplomatic interests. The Clean
Development Mechanism would provide new funds to aid economic
development, domestic pollution would be mitigated by the resulting
new technologies , and announcing accession to the Kyoto Protocol
(which was done at the 2002 World Summit

00

Sustainable

Development) would show the world that China was leading
developing countries in addressing an important global issue.
Conclusion: A Brief Assessment of China's Response to Global
Warming
What are the implications of China's response to global warming and
climate change? Clearly it has done something, but equally clear is
that it is not doing anywhere near what is required to adequately
address this problem. China is of course not unique in this. Even the
world's wealthiest

coun甘y，

the United States , has failed utterly in

acting to address climate change issues. Like most countries , each
has sought to make increrriental changes domestically while
avoiding international obligations to substantially limit GHG
emissions. China's emissions of GHGs are rising fas t. lt is
increasingly a massive part of the problem, making mitigation of
climate change much less.likely. To be sure , the global economy and
the countries of Asia Pacific can benefit from China's growth , but
most of the region will also suffer from the environmental
consequences of China's economic expansion. lndeed , some island
states in Asia Pacific may even disappear as seas rise.
Given the historical responsibility of the developed countries
for the bulk of the historical pollution causing global warming ,
China should continue to ally with Asian Pacific and other countries
in an effort to push the rich countries to reduce their emissions of
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GHGs and to provide financial and technical assistance to help
vulnerable countries adapt to climate change. At the FCC C' s
conference of the parties in New Delhi in late 2002 , China joined
with India in reiterating its outright rejection of GHG emissions cuts
for developing countries , instead arguing that increased emissions
would be required to lift their people out of poverty. China revealed
its intentions at that conference. In a 'deal with the devil' (the
government and industries of the United States) it de c1 ared that
mitigating climate change - substantially reducing emissions of

GHGs and thus limiting global warming - would be impossible for
decades to come. There was a new alliance between the United
States , China and many developing countries , such as India and
members of OPEC. China agreed with the United States that
adaptation measures - transfers of funds and technology from

developed to developing countries to help them cope with climate
change - were the preferred ways to address the problem. As such,
China joined the United States in pushing the

di伍cult

issue of

cutting emissions into the future , focusing instead on gamering as
many financial and other resources as possible 台om the world's rich.
By shifting the focus of the climate talks to adaptation, and away
from mitigation, both the rich and poor countries could avoid doing
what they dread the mos t: demanding that entrenched economic
interests reduce their GHG emissions. 81
This strategy will obviously do nothing to limit global
warming and climate change. But neither is it effective for China to
continue to blame the rich countries for the problem - no matter how
justified that blame and whatever the ethical justifications for doing
so. One fact is perhaps painful to acknowledge: While the rich
countries have produced the bulk of greenhouse pollutants so far ,
they did not know they were causing global warming until about the
1980s. In contrast , at the outset of its own massive economic
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expansion, China knows that it is causing harm to the global
atmosphere. It therefore has a responsibility to act, at least within its
means.

Again, this

does

not minimize the

much

greater

responsibility of the world's rich countries , but if China can afford to
acquire new advanced weapons systems and send men into space, it
can surely afford to divert much more money and lmow-how to
reducing its own impact on the global environment. For this reason ,
China may be judged quite harshly by future generations and wi l1 be
under great moral scrutiny. Indeed , it may even bear some legal
responsibility

for 臼ture

climate change that it could arguably have

prevented.
China could - and we argue should - show true leadership on
climate change , something that has been lacking among the
developed countries. Alas , bearing in mind what we have said , it
seems unlikely that China would undertake such a pro-environment
leadership role in the Asian Pacific region or among developing
countries more broadly. There are clearly many Chinese scientists
and concerned officials that would like China to do much more. But
there are also vested economic interests , exacerbated by China's
infatuation with rapid economic growth and wea1th creation, which
overwhelm the environmentalists. There is a burgeoning car culture
- the same mistake made in the West - with a rapacious appetite for
petroleum. More broadly , there is an effort to emulate the West's
development and Western people's lifestyles , but with this comes an
emulation of their terrible history of pollution. 82 This is unfortunate ,
because a concerted transition to an economy that produces fewer
GHGs is possible , especially with financial and technical aid from
the developed world. However , such aid would have to come with
clear restrictions that the Chinese government has shown an
unwillingness to accep t. The upshot is that in the future there will be
some improvements that limit the increases in China's GHG
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emissions compared to what they might be otherwise. For the most
part, however, at least in the near term, it will be business as usual.
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